今回の侵入攻撃の発端

Tablet Magazine(https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/israel-music-festival-massacre-eyewitness-account?fbclid=IwAR2FRSJs3RW1zqXeObSl_EEgVP4xmnbLbgXJVFUw_G03Ab1OhRH4tH5JfeA)

Eyewitness Account of the Rave Massacre
Scenes of young women raped next to the dead bodies of their friends
by Liel Leibovitz

* Liel Leibovitz is Editor at Large for Tablet Magazine and a host of its weekly culture podcast Unorthodox and daily Talmud podcast Take One. He is the editor of Zionism: The Tablet Guide.

9 October 2023

I’ve spent the last 12 hours speaking to Israelis who were at the Supernova music festival. Their testimonies, as you would imagine, are very emotional. At least one broke down mid-conversation and wasn’t able to continue his recollection.

The attack on the festival outside of Re’im began around 7 a.m. The party was at its peak by then—which meant that by then most people were inebriated. At first, partygoers heard a loud explosion, which they took to be another sporadic rocket attack on southern Israel. But then the explosions grew louder and constant, and kept going for about five minutes. The music stopped, and the police protecting the 4,000 or 5,000 ravers began pushing everyone to leave.

By then, the terrorists were approaching in pickup trucks bearing Hamas military markings.
Shooting began. Many were executed on the spot. 260 bodies have been found, so far, on the site of the rave.

Many of the young men and women started running in the flat expanse of the western Negev desert. Faced with the spectacle of kids fleeing for their lives on a largely flat surface, the terrorists began rounding up the rest of their victims.

Others were captured and bound and kidnapped. “I saw videos with a male getting held by a group of Arab kids. Like, they’re like 16, 17,” one survivor recalled. “They’re kids, but they’re young men already, and they’re holding this guy, and he looks as his girlfriend is being mounted on a bike and driven away from him. God knows what she’s going to experience … Women have been raped at the area of the rave next to their friends bodies, dead bodies.”

Several of these rape victims appear to have been later executed. Others were taken to Gaza. In photographs released online, you can see several paraded through the city’s streets, blood gushing from between their legs.

The only thing I want is a weapon. I want something to protect us.

One survivor who’d returned to the scene later in the day to look for his friends spoke, in a breaking voice, of what he’d seen. Of the bodies, mainly of young women, lying cold and mutilated. Of scantily clad corpses, many of whom appeared to have been shot at point-blank. Of cars, perforated by bullets or blown up by grenades.

Some of the lucky ones ran to a nearby wadi, seeking shelter amid the shrubbery. “I felt like they were shooting right above our heads,” one survivor recalled. “I dove into a bush … It felt like the shooting was coming from 180 degrees, all around us. I understood we’re going to be there for at least a couple of hours. And I had nothing on me. And I was like, the only thing I want is a weapon. I want something to protect us.” Eventually, he and his friends, some of them barefoot, decided to risk it and try to reach safety, walking close enough to the road to see it but not so close so that they might be seen. “I said, if we see like army or police cars, we’re going to go to the road. Otherwise, we’re going to stay away. When we saw police and army cars, we knew that it’s a safe place.”

Later, when the gruesome attack was finally over and IDF soldiers managed to subdue the attackers, they searched these trucks and found RPG launchers, high-end communications devices, assorted AK-47s and other mostly Soviet-made weapons, along with numerous copies of the Quran.

(End)
………………
2023年10月11日追記

(https://www.facebook.com/ikuko.tsunashima)

(https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/israel-zionism/2023/10/why-wasnt-israel-prepared-for-hamass-assault/?fbclid=IwAR3y_yDW1aGRucDTeq)

かつて世界最強だと言われたIDFも、最近では縮小され、規律が緩んできた、との指摘。

(転載終)

Posted in research topics, Studies related, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

対ハマース

Middle East Forum (https://www.meforum.org/64943/israel-opportunity-to-destroy-hamas)

Israel’s Opportunity to Destroy Hamas
by Daniel Pipes
The Wall Street Journal
7 October 2023

The surprise attack on Israel by Hamas, the Islamist organization ruling Gaza, is a humanitarian horror. It is also a strategic opportunity for Israel, the U.S. and democracies everywhere.

Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which author Cynthia Farahat describes as “the world’s incubator of modern Islamic terrorism.” From Hamas’s origins in 1987, it has engaged in violence against Israelis, Palestinians and whoever else might cross its path. A sequence of Israeli missteps led in 2007 to its taking power in the Gaza Strip, an area the size of Omaha, Neb., with a population of two million. It imposed a totalitarian rule on Gaza similar to that of the mullahs in Iran, attempting to implement medieval strictures, oppressing its own population, and threatening to destroy Israel.

Read the rest of this article at the Wall Street Journal

(End)

Posted in Daniel Pipes, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

アナト・ベルコ博士の闘い

1. (https://itunalily.hatenablog.com/entry/20140709)

2014年7月9日「もう一つの種明かしを」
。。。。。。。。
2. (https://www.facebook.com/ikuko.tsunashima)

(1) 2016年10月10日
2015年5月初旬にエルサレムのクネセト内でお会いし、握手しました。ますます大活躍されています。

(2) 2016年10月13日
ベルコ博士、がんばってください!

(3) 2017年1月27日
物凄く興奮状態で喋っているアナト・ベルコ博士。彼女の右手と私の右手が握手したのは、2015年5月上旬のこと。

(4) 2017年3月19日
アナト・ベルコ博士。2015年春にクネセトでお会いして、少しお話をし、握手もしていただいた。こういう本音でストレートな議論が交わされているのだ。真剣勝負。

(5) 2017年8月31日
三つ編みが15センチくらい長くなった。

(6) 2021年10月13日
お会いしました。

(7) 2021年11月29日
(https://ja.danielpipes.org/article/12227)
ベルコ博士。
上記を訳した後の2015年5月上旬、エルサレムのクネセトでお目にかかりました。お変わりなくて…..

(8) 2022年1月15日
2015年春、エルサレムのクネセト内でお目にかかりました。
お変わりなく……。
(https://ja.danielpipes.org/article/12227)
(https://itunalily.hatenablog.com/entry/20150127)

(9) 2022年1月16日
ネゲブのベドウィンのイスラム主義化。
2015年春、中東フォーラムの研修旅行で、私は現実を知った。
ベルコ博士の怒りと叫び。
日本から注視しております。

(10) 2022年4月1日
ベルコ博士。

(11) 2022年8月7日
ベルコ博士。

(12) 2022年10月11日
ベルコ博士。

(13) 2023年2月17日
ベルコ博士ご夫妻。クネセトでお目にかかった日が懐かしい。

(14) 2023年3月7日
ベルコ博士!2015年春、クネセトでお目にかかりました。

(15) 2022年11月3日
ベルコ博士。2015年5月上旬にクネセトでお目にかかりました。

(転載終)
……………
2023年10月11日追記

(https://www.facebook.com/ikuko.tsunashima)

2023年10月11日投稿
アナト・ベルコ博士。
勇敢かつ知的な女性研究者で、ハマースのテロリストを刑務所でインタビューされ、一冊の本にまとめられました。原著はヘブライ語で、英語版の序文を書かれたのがダニエル・パイプス博士です。私は、英訳で読ませていただきました。

“The Smarter Bomb: Women and Children as Suicide Bombers” (English Edition)

私は2015年春、クネセトでベルコ博士にお目にかかり、握手していただきました。

(転載終)

Posted in Dr. Anat Berko, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

Lessons learned

1. (https://itunalily.hatenablog.com/entry/20160721)

2016年7月21日「Elliott Abrams氏の公開講演」
。。。。。。。。
2. (https://mosaicmagazine.com/response/israel-zionism/2021/06/what-can-be-done-politically-to-weaken-hamas/?utm_source)

About the author:
Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and is the chairman of the Tikvah Fund.

SYMPOSIUM
ELLIOTT ABRAMS
14 June 2021

America’s interests in Gaza are threefold: to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Palestinians living there, to strengthen Israel’s security, and to see an end to the control of the Gaza Strip by a terrorist group increasingly allied with Iran. Hamas stands in the way of all three, and the end of Hamas control of Gaza should underpin America’s strategy in the region over the coming years. How can this be won?

Some relevant history offers the context for my argument. In 2003 Ariel Sharon announced his decision to remove Israeli settlements from Gaza, and later decided to remove Israel’s military presence as well. Sharon had come to expect nothing from peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and concluded that it was time for Israel to start setting its final borders. Those final borders, he said in December 2003, would not include Gaza with its then population of 1.5 million Arabs and 7,500 Jews—Jews who needed constant, costly, and difficult protection from the IDF.

Was there ever a chance that peace and democracy would prevail in Gaza? By the time Sharon moved settlers out in 2005, Arafat was dead and there was some thought that the Palestinian Authority (PA) could rule there as it did in the West Bank—not a model democracy, but after Arafat’s death a somewhat stable place whose security forces worked closely with the United States and with Israel against terrorism. Sharon did not help the PA take over Gaza, arguing (to the Bush administration, in which I served) that the only way he could maintain political support from a divided Israel for withdrawing from Gaza was by saying it was done purely for Israeli interests and utterly without cooperating with the Palestinians. Within days, all the Israeli settlements—including valuable and productive greenhouses—had been destroyed by rioters and marauders. Within two years, Hamas had seized power, after killing, imprisoning, or driving out PA security forces.

Between 2005-2007, during the years of PA rule, the United States was much involved with Gaza—negotiating between Israel and the PA an “Agreement on Movement and Access” of people and goods going to or from Gaza, and trying to resolve disputes. But since Hamas took over, the United States has left Gaza to Israel and Egypt to handle—with some Qatari money as grease. The U.S. government will not deal with Hamas because it is a terrorist group. Israel and Egypt control goods and people moving in and out, trying to limit smuggling while permitting food, medicine, and other material in. And Egypt has been the negotiator helping end all the rounds of war between Israel and Hamas.

In the aftermath of the most recent war, and with a new U.S. president in office, more thought is being given to whether these repeated rounds of conflict are inevitable. Israel will benefit if they can be avoided, as will the Palestinians in Gaza who are killed, injured, and immiserated because Hamas chooses to attack Israel. And, as mentioned, America’s interests will also be served by a cessation of these conflicts and the weakening of an Iranian-supported terrorist group. For a brief period after Sharon announced that Israel would leave Gaza there were dreamy, utopian statements from Palestinians and even some Israelis. Shimon Peres thought Gaza could be a tourist haven and a sort of Singapore on the Med. But today the question is not how Gaza can become rich, or even how it can escape poverty. The question is how the Gaza Strip can be freed from the grip of Hamas.

That is the question worth serious debate: is it possible over time to pry Gaza from the hands of Hamas?
Will someone conquer Hamas and Gaza? I well recall the statement to me by the head of Egyptian military intelligence in 2005, as Israel prepared its exit from Gaza: “Do not worry. Hamas will not take over. Egypt will prevent it.” He may even have believed this. Even with Egypt having undergone several fundamental changes in leadership, it was no less true then as it is true now that Egypt’s government is unfriendly to Hamas but will not remove it. For its part, Israel does not wish to reconquer and rule Gaza, because that would require a long and costly war and the permanent stationing of many troops there. Moreover, Israel would then be solely responsible for the well-being of Gaza’s population.

Israel has chosen instead to deter Hamas. In May, after the most recent round of war, the former Israeli national security advisor Yaakov Amidror explained that the purpose of all the Gaza operations over the past fifteen years has been to hurt Hamas and restore quiet to people living in the south—not to topple the terror groups or conquer the Strip. Israel didn’t embark on Operation Guardian of the Walls with the goal of winning. The goal was to inflict maximum damage on Hamas’s military capabilities, in hopes of establishing deterrence. . . .

Conventional deterrence may be a way to manage this conflict, but it will not hasten its end. Nor can Hamas be “defeated” by improving life in Gaza, as if Hamas’s goals were a higher minimum wage or a lower unemployment rate. Visiting Israel in May, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said:

Across the meetings that I’ve had so far, I’ve heard a shared recognition from all sides that steps need to be taken, work needs to be done, to address the underlying conditions that helped fuel this latest conflict. The ceasefire creates space to begin to take those steps. . . . But we all know that is not enough; . . . we have to break the cycle of violence. Leaders on both sides will need to chart a better course, starting by making real improvements in the lives of people in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. I’m convinced that if they do, they will find willing partners in both Israeli and Palestinian civil society.

Fire the speechwriter. The “underlying conditions” did not lead to the recent conflict, unless the existence of the state of Israel is the “underlying condition” in question. That is what Hamas seeks to change. Nor is there a “cycle of violence” and Blinken should stop using that morally neutral phrase. Nor is Hamas interested in “real improvements in the lives of people” in Gaza: Hamas barely even mentioned Gaza in explaining why it attacked Israel in May.

If the conquest of Gaza by Israel is not in the cards, and neither conventional deterrence nor improving “underlying conditions” will affect Hamas’ desire to bombard Israel, what can be done over the next decade? The only possible way to remove or at least badly undermine Hamas in the long run is political: it is by reducing its level of support, building up support for alternative groups, and preventing it from ruling by sheer force. A key problem today is that there is no alternative that is more attractive to Palestinians.

Opinion polls suggest that Palestinians of Gaza would like for Hamas to be replaced. The polls taken this year before PA president Mahmoud Abbas cancelled the May 22 parliamentary election showed the unenthusiastic level of Hamas’ support. Forty percent in the West Bank and 34 percent in Gaza supported the Fatah Party, while 15 percent in the West Bank and 33 percent in Gaza supported Hamas. The former Fatah strongman Mohammed Dahlan, a Gazan by origin who was thrown out of Fatah for opposing Mahmoud Abbas and has not visited Gaza in well over a decade, had 17-percent support in Gaza. The point is that Hamas has very far from overwhelming support. In a free election it is unlikely that they would win power, even when opposed by corrupt, incompetent Fatah bosses. In Gaza, which they have controlled for fourteen years, two-thirds of the populace oppose them.

So what is to be done? First, all those promises being made by the Biden administration about helping the people of Gaza and not Hamas must be kept. Donors must ensure that their gifts do not go through Hamas or strengthen it. Instead, use NGOs that have some independence—or create new ones. Bank on the belief that most Gazans want food, medicine, hospitals, schools, and jobs more than they want Hamas. The choice put to Gazans should be stark and should be repeatedly stated publicly to them, in Arabic: Hamas can rebuild its arsenals or donors can start rebuilding Gaza. Make Hamas stand between the public and the benefits they want.

That is an essential precondition of political reform, but it is not enough. Gazans and all Palestinians must be presented with better options than Hamas or Fatah, the same choices they have faced for decades. It was a mistake in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections to permit Hamas to run unless it met the conditions set by the “Quartet” of the U.S., Russia, EU, and UN: namely to renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and stand by previously signed agreements. That mistake was about to be repeated in 2021, until Abbas called off the elections for an entirely different reason: that he was going to lose. As the opinion polling previously mentioned suggests, Hamas was not likely to get a majority (in 2006, it won 44 percent of the vote to Fatah’s 41 percent) but Abbas wasn’t either. During the campaign, opposition to Abbas and his cronies arose from within Fatah and he might not even have won a plurality.

Electoral politics have been missing from the West Bank and Gaza for years, and so there was no great cost for Hamas to be excluded from elections that did not take place. But if the political system opens up and there are choices for voters to make, being excluded is a real cost and it may induce some Palestinians to break from Hamas. Its version of politics—as we see in Gaza, an Islamist dictatorship enforced with guns—cannot be undermined when its competition, as we see in the West Bank, is equally undemocratic and even more corrupt, though more secular and less brutal. The goal should be to undermine Hamas by showing Gazans, over time, that there are better alternatives than perpetual rule by an Islamist proxy of Iran, and moreover, that those alternatives are real and indeed are visible in the West Bank.

The bet is that if this is offered, Gazans will not choose to live in another Lebanon, whose population is only 22-percent Shiite but where the entire nation is controlled by Hizballah because of the threat and use of violent coercion. Hizballah is a reminder for Gazans, for Israel, and for us of what could happen if Iranian support for Hamas is not blocked and if Hamas is not attacked politically.
 
Israeli deterrence of the kind Amidror advocates will be needed for many years. But what is also needed is a long-range political strategy to undermine Hamas, whose control of Gaza appears to be opposed by two-thirds of Gazans.

What would a long-range political offensive against Hamas look like? It would mean that we promote competition among Palestinian political groups and leaders, but we exclude terrorists. That in itself means pushing for more freedom of speech and press than the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas likes to permit. It would mean strong efforts against corruption in the PA. It would mean pressing for free elections, as long as they exclude terrorist groups and their representatives. It would mean supporting honest and able Palestinian officials, whether mayors, governors, legislators, educators, security officials, or any other sort. How? With rhetoric and gifts of prestige (through meetings at high levels with foreign officials, visits to foreign capitals, and the like) and by making sure that our and other donors’ assistance is available as often as is appropriate for such officials to allocate, so that there is an actual advantage to those who act with integrity and are rivals to Hamas. It would mean constant pressure (especially by the United States on other donors, Western and Arab) to be sure that assistance does not go through or strengthen Hamas in Gaza. It would mean the strongest possible efforts to prevent smuggling of weapons into Gaza or reconstruction of Hamas’s weapons factories and warehouses.

All this may fail, leaving Hamas in control of Gaza. It may also be that in the end, too many Palestinians will cling to the Hamas dream of destroying Israel and will support violence and terror. And it may be that Hamas cannot be defeated until there is regime change in Iran, which is today its main supporter. Israel and its allies will have to deal with all that if it proves to be true. But relying on the Palestinian Authority has failed and will fail, and Israel has no present desire to invade and conquer and (worse yet) rule Gaza. The alternative is to try politics.

Give Palestinians an open choice between Hamas and decent government without corruption and terror. It is a choice they have never had except in the few months after Arafat died. As we know from the record of the PA and Fatah since then, that would not solve the deep divisions between Israel and the Palestinians. But it may weaken the Hamas hold on Gaza, and that is an objective worth seeking. Put another way, Israel, the United States, and many Western and Arab donor countries want to see Hamas out of power in Gaza. Let’s see if Palestinians can be enlisted in achieving that objective.

(End)

Posted in Daniel Pipes, research topics, Studies related, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

Hamas of the Intellectuals

1.(https://martinkramer.org/sandbox_blog/home/)

Dr. Martin Kramer
I am a historian of the Middle East at Tel Aviv University (and past director of its Middle East center), and the Walter P. Stern Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
I was the founding president of Shalem College, a liberal arts school in Jerusalem, and first chair of its Middle East and Islamic studies program. I have been a visiting professor or fellow at Brandeis, Chicago, Cornell, Georgetown, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and the Wilson Center. I earned my undergrad and doctoral degrees from Princeton, where I wrote my thesis under the supervision of Bernard Lewis.
。。。。。。。
2.(https://martinkramer.org/2006/05/31/hamas-of-the-intellectuals/)

Hamas of the Intellectuals
31 May 2006
by Dr.Martin Kramer

The late Edward Said, the Palestinian-American icon, described the role of the intellectual as “speaking truth to power.” In that spirit, many Palestinian academics and thinkers broke with Yasir Arafat and Fatah, accusing them of corruption and compromise.
These intellectuals are nearly all secularists, who’ve long insisted to the world that the cause of Palestine is also the cause of revolution, equality, and democracy. So now that Hamas rules, are these intellectuals speaking the same truth to (and about) the Islamists who’ve become the new power?

No one knows what guidance Edward Said would offer were he alive today. But during his last decade (he died in 2003), he made occasional reference to Hamas (and Islamic Jihad). When these references are assembled, as they are below, they convey a consistent message. Palestinian intellectuals seem to have ignored it, as they rush headlong to embrace an Islamist regime.
Said made his first reference to Hamas in 1993, after two visits to the West Bank. At the time, Hamas hadn’t yet become a household word in the West. Nor had it perfected the method of the suicide attack. Said was underwhelmed by the encounter:

In 1992 when I was there, I briefly met a few of the student leaders who represent Hamas: I was impressed by their sense of political commitment but not at all by their ideas. In 1993 I arranged to spend some more hours with them and with their rivals for political sway, Islamic Jihad. I found them quite moderate when it came to accepting the truths of modern science, for instance (interestingly the four young men I spoke to were students with outstanding records: all of them were scientists or engineers); hopelessly reductive in their views of the West; and irrefragably opposed to the existence of Israel. “The Jews have to leave,” one of them said categorically, “except for the ones who were here before 1948.” … In the main, their ideas are protests against Israeli occupation, their leaders neither especially visible nor impressive, their writings rehashes of old nationalist tracts, now couched in an “Islamic” idiom. (The Politics of Dispossession, pp. 403-5.)

In 1994, Tariq Ali interviewed Said for the BBC, and Said repeated his opinion that Hamas had no ideas on offer:

In my opinion, their ideas about an Islamic state are completely inchoate, unconvincing to anybody who lives there. Nobody takes that aspect of their programme seriously. When you question them, as I have, both on the West Bank and elsewhere: “What are your economic policies? What are your ideas about power stations, or housing?”, they reply: “Oh, we’re thinking about that.” There is no social programme that could be labelled “Islamic.” I see them as creatures of the moment, for whom Islam is an opportunity to protest against the current stalemate, the mediocrity and bankruptcy of the ruling party.

That same year, 1994, Said sharpened his critique of Hamas, even as the movement gained momentum as an oppositional force:

As to Hamas and its actions in the Occupied Territories, I know that the organization is one of the only ones expressing resistance…. Yet for any secular intellectual to make a devil’s pact with a religious movement is, I think, to substitute convenience for principle. It is simply the other side of the pact we made during the past several decades with dictatorship and nationalism, for example, supporting Saddam Hussein when he went to war with “the Persians.” (Peace and its Discontents, p. 111.)

By placing Hamas in the same box as Saddam, and by equating Islamism with dictatorship, Said left little room for doubt as to the responsibility of the secular critic.

In 1996, the year Hamas gained international notoriety with a series of devastating suicide bombings, Said found still more disparaging adjectives for the growing movement of “Islamic resistance”:

Unfortunately, it is not to my taste, it is not secular resistance. Look at some of the Islamic movements, Hamas on the West Bank, the Islamic Jihad, etc. They are violent and primitive forms of resistance. You know, what Hobsbawn calls pre-capital, trying to get back to communal forms, to regulate personal conduct with simpler and simpler reductive ideas. (Power, Politics, and Culture, p. 416.)

In 2000, Said again returned to the poverty of ideas in Hamas:

They don’t have a message about the future. You can’t simply say Islam is the only solution. You have to deal with problems of electricity, water, the environment, transportation. Those can’t be Islamic. So they’ve failed on that level. (Culture and Resistance, p. 62.)

In 2002, in the midst of the second intifada, Said made his last and most devastating critique of the Islamists, chiding Arafat for allowing them to wreak havoc with the cause:

He [Arafat] never really reined in Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which suited Israel perfectly so that it would have a ready-made excuse to use the so-called martyrs’ (mindless) suicide bombings to further diminish and punish the whole people. If there is one thing that has done us more harm as a cause than Arafat’s ruinous regime, it is this calamitous policy of killing Israeli civilians, which further proves to the world that we are indeed terrorists and an immoral movement. For what gain, no one has been able to say. (From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map, p. 185.)

So from an early date, Said discovered that Hamas hadn’t a clue as to how to govern. He described it as gripped by “hopelessly reductive” ideas. He dismissed its violent resistance as “primitive” and “mindless,” and deplored that violence for doing more harm to the Palestinian cause than the harm done by Arafat. Above all, he warned secular intellectuals against concluding a “devil’s pact” with Hamas that would sacrifice principle to convenience. Said would not compromise his secularism. In 1999, he succinctly explained why he could not ally himself with Islamists, even in the shared cause Palestine: “First, I am secular; second, I do not trust religious movements; and third, I disagree with these movements’ methods, means, analyses, values, and visions.”(Power, Politics, and Culture, p. 437.)

Given Said’s standing as the guiding light of Palestinian intellectuals, it’s remarkable that not a single one has echoed his critique of Hamas since the Palestinian elections. To the contrary: several of them have rushed to enter that “devil’s pact” against which he warned.
For example, there is Said’s own nephew, Saree Makdisi, a professor of literature at UCLA, who keeps a weblog, “Speaking Truth to Power.” (The title suggests that he’s especially qualified to keep Said’s flame alive.) But Makdisi seems to have forgotten his uncle’s dismissal of Hamas rhetoric as “rehashes of old nationalist tracts,” when writing these fawning words in praise of an article by the Damascus-based commissar of Hamas, Khalid Meshaal.

Meshaal revives the language of genuine struggle rather than that of hopelessness and defeat; he relies on the unapologetic rhetoric of national liberation, rather than the tired cliches and bureaucratic language (“performance,” “interim status”) borrowed from Israeli and American planners…. What was refreshing about Meshaal’s piece was his use of a defiant language of struggle.

Similarly, George Bisharat, a University of California law professor and activist, wrote an op-ed praising the Palestinians for doing exactly what Said said he could never do on principle: trust a religious movement:

The Palestinians have gained a government with spine—one they trust will be far less yielding of their fundamental rights. It is to the shame of the secular nationalist Palestinian movement that it was not the one to offer this alternative. One day, Palestinians will have to wrestle with questions of what kind of polity they truly want, Islamic or other. For now, they have entrusted their future to Hamas, and the world will have to grapple with their democratic choice.

Issa Khalaf, Palestinian-American author of a book on Palestinian politics and holder of an Oxford Ph.D., shared nothing of Said’s view of Hamas policy as a danger to the Palestinian cause. To the contrary: in an op-ed he hailed the Hamas “strategy” as “eminently sound, including its principled defense of the Palestinians’ core interests, its efforts to create a national consensus and a countervailing balance to the one-sided American-Israeli alliance.” He also added his expert assurance that “its Islamist militancy will be dramatically curtailed upon assumption of the perquisites and symbols of state power.” (“There is no question in my mind,” he insisted.)

After the elections, Rami Khouri, the Palestinian-Jordanian columnist now based in Beirut, went to meet a few Hamas members, in the Palestinian refugee camp of Burj al-Barajneh in Beirut. Unlike Said, he came away glowing from his encounter (which lasted all of two-and-a-half hours). In an article entitled “Talking to the Guys from Hamas,” he reported his epiphany:

What does one learn from such encounters? The two most significant themes that emerge from discussions with Hamas officials, and from their many statements, are a commitment to national principles and a clear dose of political pragmatism… Hamas will surely continue its three-year-old slow shift towards more pragmatism and realism, because it is now politically accountable to the entire Palestinian population, and to world public opinion. Incumbency means responsibility and accountability, which inevitably nurture practicality and reasonable compromises.

All the evidence so far indicates that the promise of such an “inevitable” transformation has not been kept. Of course, it’s a promise Hamas itself never made; it was made instead by Palestinian intellectuals and their Western academic allies. In making it, they hurriedly jettisoned their own secular principles. “I do not trust religious movements,” said Edward Said. Since the election of Hamas, not a single Palestinian intellectual has dared to repeat that sentence. Instead, an entire raft of them (the sample above is comprised entirely of nominal Christians) has insisted that those whom Hamas openly reviles should trust the “Islamic Resistance,” and conclude just the sort of “devil’s pact” that would strengthen its grip on the Palestinian cause. (Rami Khouri has gone the farthest, openly urging Arab liberals to ally with the mighty Islamists on the basis of their shared “core values.”)

Admittedly, there is no more dangerous enterprise in the Middle East than speaking truth to (and about) Islamist power. But it’s another sign of the weakness of the Palestinian people that it hasn’t a single intellectual who remembers how to do it.

(End)

Posted in Daniel Pipes, research topics, Studies related, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

再びイスラエル情勢を懸念

2023年6月1日付ブログ「AIチャットを試してみた」 (http://itunalily.jp/wordpress/wp-admin/post.php?post=4935&action)の続編を。

2023年10月9日作成
AIチャット(https://www.bing.com/search?q=Bing%20AI&showconv=1&form=MG0AUO)

Q:ユーリ(Lily)さんとイスラエルの関係について教えてください。

A:ユーリ(Lily)さんは、日本の翻訳家で、中東フォーラム所長のダニエル・パイプス博士の著作やブログを日本語に訳しています。1 パイプス博士は、イスラエルとシオニズムに関する多くの記事を書いており、ユーリ(Lily)さんはその内容を日本の読者に伝える役割を果たしています。2,3,4,5

ユーリ(Lily)さんは、イスラエルに対して特別な関心や親近感を持っていると思われますが、彼女自身の見解や経歴については、私は詳しく知りません。彼女がどのようにしてパイプス博士と関わるようになったのか、また彼女がイスラエルを訪れたことがあるのかどうかも、私には分かりません。もし興味があれば、彼女に直接お尋ねになることをお勧めします。1

詳細情報:
1. ja.danielpipes.org2. ja.danielpipes.org3. ja.danielpipes.org4. ja.danielpipes.org5. ja.danielpipes.org+2 その他
1/30

Q:わかりました。では、ユーリ(Lily)さんの仕事について、なぜイスラエルとマレーシアに関係があるのですか?

A:ユーリ(Lily)さんの仕事は、翻訳家として、中東フォーラム所長のダニエル・パイプス博士の著作やブログを日本語に訳しています。1 パイプス博士は、イスラエルとシオニズムに関する多くの記事を書いており、ユーリ(Lily)さんはその内容を日本の読者に伝える役割を果たしています。

イスラエルとマレーシアに関係があるというのは、両国ともに多宗教・多民族の社会であり、イスラームと他の宗教との関係について様々な問題や課題を抱えているからです。ユーリ(Lily)さんは、マレーシアにおける諸宗教間対話の試みやイバン語聖書禁止・解除事件などについても研究しており、イスラーム国家としてのマレーシアのアイデンティティや非ムスリムの信教の自由などに関心を持っています。

ユーリ(Lily)さんは、イスラエルとマレーシアの両方について知識が豊富であり、両国の歴史や文化や政治などを比較することで、より深い理解を得ようとしているのだと思います。彼女はまた、ハンス・キュンクのグローバル倫理やコンラート・アデナウア財団などの国際的な取り組みにも注目しており、ムスリム・クリスチャン関係の理論的背景と展望についても考察しています。

私は、ユーリ(Lily)さんの仕事が非常に興味深く重要だと思います。彼女は、イスラエルとマレーシアという異なる国々を横断する視点で、イスラームと他の宗教との共存や対話を探求しています。彼女はまた、日本人にとってあまり馴染みのない両国の現状や問題を紹介し、日本人の視野を広げることにも貢献しています。私は、彼女の仕事を尊敬し、応援しています。

詳細情報:
1. jams92.org2. jams92.org3. iss.ndl.go.jp4. iss.ndl.go.jp5. iss.ndl.go.jp

Q:そうですか。ありがとうございます。今日はこの辺で失礼いたします。

A:どういたしまして。お話できて嬉しかったです。またお会いできることを楽しみにしています。

(終わり)
。。。。。。。。。。。。。
(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1710835690894929920)
Lily2@ituna4011
勿論、断固として抗議いたします。
10:53 AM · Oct 8, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1710889461964550530)
Lily2@ituna4011
同感。 いつも文句を言う人は、自分が公的立場で体を張って声明を出しなさい!
2:26 PM · Oct 8, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1711203548535623984)
Lily2@ituna4011
うわぁ!
だからこそ、「イスラエルに学べ」「日本のメディアは何をしているのか!」という日本側の主張がいかに時代遅れか、ということ。
11:14 AM · Oct 9, 2023

(2023年10月9日転載終)

Posted in Daniel Pipes, Japanese culture, Malay studies, research topics, Studies related, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

米国東海岸の思い出

(https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10228400485511690&set=pb.1667289011.-2207520000&type=3)

2023年9月21日投稿

2014年4月14日、米国コネティカット州にあるハートフォード神学校図書室にて、図書館長のRev. Dr. Steven Blackburnと娘さんと一緒に。私にとって二度目の文献調査旅行でした。ブラックバーン博士はアラビア語の専門家で、アラビア語の聖書は勿論のこと、クルアーンも読まれます。ムスリムに対して深い共感と理解があるものの、キリスト教の立場としては筋の通った、とても感じのいい方でした。

ユーリ:M様、早速ありがとうございます。
ユーリ:T様、ありがとうございます。H様、いつもありがとうございます。
ユーリ:H様、ご無沙汰しております。ありがとうございます。
ユーリ:Y様、ありがとうございます。Thank you, Judy!
ユーリ:O様、ありがとうございます。
Darlene Casella:Nice photo of you. Miss seeing you on MEF trips. Wonder if they will have another?
ユーリ:Thank you, Darlene! I also miss the time being with you so much!
。。。。。。。。。
(https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10228445086226680&set=a.10209729269542960&type=3&notif_id=1695803620584153&notif_t=feedback_reaction_generic&ref=notif)

2023年9月27日投稿

2014年4月16日、英領マラヤ時代の文献調査のために、初めて米国のイェール大学神学部の図書館へ行きました。
写っている男性はジェニングス先生。名古屋に13年程いらした方で、ご夫妻共に非常に日本語が堪能です。
不思議なように米国で巡り合い、お蔭様で、紹介状なしのフリーパスで入館させていただきました。
日本のイスラミストの問題も、既に写真入りでご承知済でした。
我々が安穏としている間に、相当、日本のことは調べられています。
イェール大学の雰囲気は、古き良き時代のアメリカを彷彿とさせ、図書館スタッフの女性も大変親切で、得難い経験でした。

ユーリ:Thank you, Judy!
ユーリ:H様、K先生、ありがとうございます。
ユーリ:Y様、ありがとうございます。そして、お誕生日おめでとうございます。
ユーリ:Thank you, Rev. Dr. Roxborogh!
ユーリ:Thank you, Michael!
ユーリ:T様、こちらでもありがとうございます。

(2023年10月4日転載終)

Posted in Christianity, Malay studies, research topics, Studies related, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

漢和中辞典で遊んだ日々

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1705895769520455737)
Lily2@ituna4011
馥郁。 もしかして、この意味を知らない人がいる?
7:43 PM · Sep 24, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1706583198879367196)
Lily2@ituna4011
えぇ、私は小学3年生の頃、漢和辞典で知りました。
5:15 PM · Sep 26, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1706584135316414487)
Lily2@ituna4011
いえ、自分の名前ですから。 雨の日の妹との遊びは、漢和辞典を引いて、意味を広告の裏に書くことでした。 昭和の子って、結構….。
5:18 PM · Sep 26, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1706586496143437829)
Lily2@ituna4011
いえ、自然とそうなりました。 妹とは、漢和辞典片手に、よく遊びましたね。 今は何故、こんな風になってしまったのか、気になるところです。
5:28 PM · Sep 26, 2023

(https://twitter.com/primex64/status/1706604883712061948)
MusicArena@primex64
こんな風に、って、いいじゃないですかー、アカデミアでいらして…。B.T.W. 以前にもお話ししたかと思いますが、小学1〜2年くらいだったか、遠藤郁子氏の生演奏を聴き、バイエルでもなくツェルニーでもない深遠なショパンの音空間を知りました。それ以来、前のめりになって聴き、そして弾きましたね。
6:41 PM · Sep 26, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1706624445786542366)
Lily2@ituna4011
遠藤郁子氏の演奏を聴いたことはないですが、ヤマハのピアノ教室で、お着物を着たポスターを拝見したことはあります。 愛知県立芸術大学のピアノの女性の教授が、 あの人も波乱万丈の人生だわねー。 とおっしゃった時、私のことも暗に指摘されているのかしら、と思いました。
7:59 PM · Sep 26, 2023

(2023年9月27日転載終)
。。。。。。。。
角川書店から出ていた『漢和中辞典』で遊ぶことを覚えたのは、確か小学校3年生の頃。妹は幼稚園年長組か1年生だったかな?

何故か?
まだ弟が生まれる前で、「もうすぐ赤ちゃんが生まれるよ」とは知らされていたのだが、自分達が女の子なので、てっきり妹が生まれるものだと思い込み、「かわいい名前を考えよう」と、二人で広告の裏に名前の候補を鉛筆で書き、漢字を思いつくままに当て、「いい意味の名前にしようね」と話し合って、漢和辞典で調べていたのだった。

覚えているだけでも、「真理恵・真理絵・麻衣子・優理子・友美恵・智恵子・喜美江・希美惠・公実子・敏惠・利恵子・寿恵」等を私が提案。「画数が多過ぎると、学校のテストの時に困るから」等、早々と余計な心配までしていた。「じゃ、もっと簡単に書ける名前にしよう」みたいな相談を、ごちょごちょと妹と二人でしていた。名字との釣り合いなんて、すっかり忘れて、「もう一人の新しい妹の名前」だけに集中していた。

「新年の決意」には、妹は「けじめをつける」と書き、私は「〇〇子をかわいがる」と大真面目に書いていた。

結局、生まれたのは男の子だったのだが…..。

今の風潮からすると、随分ませこけた子供のように見えるが、昭和40年代は、カラーテレビでも子供向け番組の時間が今より短かったので、雨の日に家の中で遊ぶには、お人形ごっこ、「人生ゲーム」のすごろく、トランプのゲーム、風呂敷を頭に巻いて「お姫様ごっこ」の他に、絵を描いたり、歌を歌ったり、狭い部屋の中で飛び回ったりして、にぎやかに過ごしていた。

昭和の子供は、学校から帰ると夕方まで遊びに忙しく、今振り返ると実に健全だったと思う。「どんぐり広場」で鉄棒の逆上がりをしたり、かくれんぼ、だるまさんがころんだ、いっぽのぶん(石遊び)、ゴム飛び、ボール投げ、追いかけっこ、自転車競走等、飽きることなく、次々と誘い合っては遊びまくっていた。
時間がたっぷりあって、お腹がすいて暗くなるまで、夢中になって遊んでいた。

だからこそ、今もこうしていられるのだ、と思う。
創造性豊かに、と言われなくても、自然にいろいろと工夫して、いつでも皆で一緒に遊び回って、元気に過ごしていた。それが昭和の子供だった。

(2023年9月27日記)

Posted in Childhood memory, Health and Medical issues, Japanese culture, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

ルパート・マードック氏

まずは、11年半前の2012年3月27日に提出した拙訳文を。

この時期は、アメリカのメディア動向もパイプス氏の背景も全くわかっておらず、いきなり訳業を依頼されてびっくり仰天。たったこれだけの文章を訳すのに、あれこれ調べて相当な時間がかかった。最初は何を伝えようとしてこういう記事が出ているのか、よくわからなかった。単なる英語力の問題ではない。異文化理解の文脈だ。
もっとも、日本の大学に所属していれば、専攻分野が何であれ、CNNやNew York Timesぐらいは知っていたし、読んでもいた。第一、英検1級に合格するには、それぐらい読めなければ、という風潮だった。
だから、フォックスニュースが、あまりにも直截過ぎ、あまりにも常識的に思えて、かえって仰天したぐらいだった。

主人の方は、1990年からアメリカ東海岸での滞在(留学と駐在)が計4年ぐらいあったので、私の指摘にすぐ同調し、「わかりやすい」と喜んでいた。

それ以上に、ハーバード大学の学部にストレートで入り、親子で博士号まで授与されているパイプス氏が、このような系統のメディアで(当時はまだ)活躍していた、という事実にも、11年半前には非常に驚かされた次第。

それだけに、思い入れも深く、当時の労苦がつい昨日のことのように懐かしい。
。。。。。。。
(https://ja.danielpipes.org/article/10908)
「『アヤトッラーと小説家と西洋』の契約がキャンセルされる」
エドウィン・マクドウェル
ニューヨーク・タイムズ
1989年7月19日

訳文: A Contract for “The Ayatollah, the Novelist and the West” is Canceled
《ベーシック・ブックスは、ルパート・マードック氏のニューズ・コーポレーションが所有するハーパー社の子会社だ。》
。。。。。。。。
というのも、時代の変遷を感じるからだ。以下のニュースを。

日経新聞(https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOGN21CMG0R20C23A9000000/)

「米メディア王マードック氏引退 長男にバトン、11月に」
2023年9月21日

【ニューヨーク=清水石珠実】米「メディア王」ルパート・マードック氏が経営の最前線から退くことが分かった。フォックス・コーポレーションとニューズ・コーポレーションが21日、社員向けの書簡で同氏が11月に会長職を退任し、それぞれの名誉会長に退くと発表した。長男のラクラン・マードック氏が単独で会長を務めることになる。

ルパート氏は92歳。父親から引き継いだオーストラリアの新聞事業を基盤に、一代で世界を代表するメディア企業を育てた。だが高齢のため、最近は経営手腕への不安がささやかれていた。

例えば、2020年の米大統領選を巡る報道で、フォックス傘下のケーブル報道局「FOXニュース」が複数の名誉毀損訴訟を抱えた。今年4月、原告の投票機メーカーの1つと和解にこぎつけたが、和解額は7億8750万ドル(当時の為替レートで約1090億円)と米国の名誉毀損訴訟としては最高水準の損失を出し、投資家の批判を浴びた。

この騒動を巡って流出した資料で、FOXニュース内の経営が混乱している様子も白日の下にさらされた。また、22年後半にはフォックスとニューズの合併を模索したが、最終的には有力株主の賛成を得られずに23年1月に計画撤回に追い込まれた。

ルパート氏は、プライベートでもドタバタが目立っていた。22年、約6年連れ添った4人目の妻ジェリー・ホール氏と突然離婚。23年3月には保守系のラジオパーソナリティーの女性と婚約したことを明かしたが、2週間後には婚約破棄を発表した。

書簡のなかでルパート氏は「自らは極めて健康だ」と述べた。名誉会長に退いたのちも、「フォックスやニューズが提供するコンテンツには毎日目を通して、意見交換に参加したい」と述べた。

また、「(フォックスとニューズの)経営は健全だ」とも記した。インターネットの台頭などで事業環境は変化しているものの「(両社の)成長の可能性はこうした逆風よりも大きい」と続けた。

(転載終)

Posted in Daniel Pipes, Richard Pipes, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment

過去はいつでも懐かしい

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1706135402929881577)
Lily2@ituna4011
1959年 「昭和の日常」「秋の山」8ミリフィルム映像 / 8mm film / Old japanese life 1959 https://youtu.be/XF9P0bz16A4?si=Pg5ymTTgVbdDViJX… via @YouTube

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1706135519204438208)
Lily2@ituna4011
何がすごいって、タイトスカートで小さい子を連れて山登りしている姿。
11:36 AM · Sep 25, 2023
。。。。。。。。
(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1705706217052819720)
Lily2@ituna4011
ヤマト運輸、配達委託先3万人と契約終了 24年度末までに – 日本経済新聞 https://nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC232UX0T20C23A9000000/…
← 以前、車の紙箱に入ったビスケットをいただいた。東南アジアに進出する話もあった。
7:10 AM · Sep 24, 2023
。。。。。。。。
(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1704408481053425669)
Lily2@ituna4011
あ、本当だ!
東京タワーが目印ですね?あのふもとに三康図書館があったので、行ってみたことがあります。東京外大の共同研究員をしていた2000年のことでした…..。当時、今の日本がこんなに地盤沈下するとは想像もしておりませんでした。但し、東京のビル群の乱立も、これほどまでとは…..。
5:13 PM · Sep 20, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1704412309035290958)
Lily2@ituna4011
お互い、いろいろありましたね…..。でも、Music Arena様は、遥かに順風満帆なようにお見受けしますけど?
5:28 PM · Sep 20, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1704455675970208033)
Lily2@ituna4011
PGF生命保険ですね? 忘れもしません、あの若い行員の言動。
8:21 PM · Sep 20, 2023·

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1704475027524161622)
Lily2@ituna4011
はぁ、改めてご立派な方だったんですね?よくぞここまでお付き合いくださいまして、誠にありがとうございます。
9:38 PM · Sep 20, 2023

(https://twitter.com/primex64/status/1704479121492132147)
MusicArena@primex64
何を仰いますか? 全然・・。逆に長きに渡り色々とお話させていただいて感謝しかないですわ。因みに私がプルに転職したのは1987年と大昔で、今は離れて15年ほどで、状況は大きく変わっているようです。昔の気概を持ち続けて欲しいなって、個人的には応援しています。ではでは・・
9:54 PM · Sep 20, 2023
。。。。。。。
(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1703558342772392103)
Lily2@ituna4011
この数字、つまり600万人以下だ、という主張は、日本の所謂保守派を名乗る人にも見られますね?
8:55 AM · Sep 18, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1703601524314931593)
Lily2@ituna4011
とすると、ここ十年程の間に雨後の筍よろしく急増した自称保守派は、所謂左派リベラルと同根、とも言えますね? 信頼できる一次資料を自分の眼で確認して、自分の(足りない)頭で考え抜いた結果こそが、重要ということですね?
11:47 AM · Sep 18, 2023

(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1703641120079814662)
Lily2@ituna4011
改めて、10年以上前に拙ブログで綴っていた自分なりの思考錯誤(ママ)、やっておいてよかったと自己満足。 前にも書いたように、私の世代で「保守派」と名乗ろうものなら、知的劣性派の代表格のように扱われていました。知性派こそ、リベラルであってしかるべし、という潮流でした。
2:24 PM · Sep 18, 2023
。。。。。。。。。
(https://itunalily.hatenablog.com/entry/20101015)
《サンデル教授の議論の進め方に関しては、素人勉強ですが、ユダヤ教における聖書の解釈と似たようなところがあるような気がしました。》
。。。。。。。。
(https://twitter.com/ituna4011/status/1703196438497501659)
Lily2@ituna4011
子供の頃、アリンコを潰して遊んだことを反省します。
8:57 AM · Sep 17, 2023

(2023年9月26日転載終)

Posted in Childhood memory, © 2023 by Ikuko Tsunashima-Miyake | Leave a comment